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Political representation, as key concept of liberal democracy, is under multiple pressures.
Across many liberal democracies, populist parties, who claim to have amandate formore
direct representation, are on the rise. In their rhetoric, religion plays a crucial role.
Religion is, however, not only relevant on a discursive level but in fact involved in all
dimensions of political representation and their crises. I deployHanna F. Pitkin!s concept
of representation together with Michael Saward!s concept of discursive representation
and discuss examples from empirical research on the politicization of religion in Austria
in the context of migration. This case is of particular interest when discussing the crisis of
representation, as political representation in contemporary Austria is characterized by a
strong populist far right party and a recent renunciation of a longstanding inclusive
tradition towards politics of religion. I conclude by discussing empirical analyses that
show strong exclusionary tendencies towards Muslims while representatives freuquently
claim to act as, and speak for, Christians against the increasing pressure on liberalism.
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Introduction
Papers about politics and religion all too often start with a reference to the return
of religion to the public sphere or a similar observation. The fact that social
scientists are eager towrite about politics and religion confirms and reinforces this
development. When talking about religion and representation, this is no ex-
ception.Within the liberal democratic setting that coinedmost European states in
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their more recent history, religion played a minor role in the sphere of formal
politics. A variety of developments, among them the diversification of religious
landscapes, the prominence of religious fundamentalism and religiously moti-
vated violence, growing public resentments against some religious groups, and the
(re-)discovery of religion as a resource for voter mobilization, brought religion
high on the political agenda.
This politicization of religion happens while political representation, as a
central concept of democracy, is under multiple pressures. The crisis of repre-
sentation, which is debated in this issue, relates to religion in a variety of ways, but
as neither religion, nor representation, are enclosed concepts, it is a complex task
to pin them down. On the one hand, liberal democratic representation aims to
include and mirror societal diversification, also with regards to religion. On the
other, religion and the claim for religious representation are used in rhetoric to
prevent this inclusion. What is more, the inner diversity of religions makes an
apparently simple category of difference difficult to represent and the neutrality
mandate of the liberal state prevents state actors from taking sides, at least in
theory.
In this paper, I want to ask how religion relates to the idealistic concept of
liberal democratic representation and its inherent pitfalls, and which underlying
problems of liberal democratic representation are understoodwith the help of the
case of politicized religion. The paper proceeds as follows: First, I will present
concepts of political representation, in particular the political system centered
approach by Hanna F. Pitkin and Michael Saward!s idea of discursive repre-
sentation. This conceptual introduction will be followed by a discussion of the
pitfalls of liberal democratic representation in times of diversifying societies. In a
third part, I discuss religion and the crisis of representation, using the Austrian
example as a particularly information-rich case, suited for purposeful sampling
(Patton 1999). In this third part, I will introduce the case of political representa-
tion in Austria, present the empirical data base and discuss the particular role of
religion along the empirical results and the theoretical concepts of Pitkin and
Saward. In a concluding discussion, I argue that the current crisis of political
representation is first and foremost a crisis of liberalism and therefore a question
of competing norms.
1. Conceptualizing Liberal Democratic Political Representation
When talking about a crisis of liberal democratic representation, it is useful to
distinguish the three concepts involved. Representation and its theorization
predate democratic systems. Although representation is nowadays mostly dis-
cussed in democratic settings, it is in itself not bound to democracy. Thomas
Hobbes as one of the most influential thinkers of political representation argued
his Leviathan not at all in a democratic perspective, but it is still discussed by
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scholars of representation (Hobbes 1651; Runciman 2010). Democracy, most
basically understood as a political system whose members exercise power col-
lectively, can hardly be thought of without any form of political representation.
Usually, voting is the mechanism to install “a necessary correspondence between
acts of governance and the equallyweighted felt interests of citizenswith regard to
these acts” (Saward 1998, 1). Such voting also takes place in amere issue oriented
direct democratic setting. In reality, even political systems with well-developed
direct democratic instruments are representative democracies, as they install
representatives to govern beyond referenda. Political systems that are further
characterized by the acceptance of human rights, the rule of law and its emphasis
on the individual as holder of rights and the normative goal of striving towards
equality among, and freedom for, their members can be considered liberal de-
mocracies (Kelly 2005). Representation in liberal democracies and its proclaimed
crisis is this papers! focus.
One of themostwell-known scholars in this debate isHannaF. Pitkin, who calls
representation “the making present in some sense of something which is never-
theless not present literally or in fact” (1967, 8). This approach to representation is
rooted in formerly religious references that have increasingly been understood as
political. In a democracy, the something that is not present is the sovereignty of the
people,meaning the shared power of themembers of the democratic entity, which
is not embodied or personalized. Classical questions that theories of political
representation consider in this process are what makes a person or institution and
their actions representative and for whom or what (individuals, groups, interests,
etc.).
Following Hannah F. Pitkin, we can differentiate between formalistic, stand-
ing-for (descriptive and symbolic) and substantive representation1. Formalistic
representation refers to authorization and accountability of representation.
While authorization is central to any form of representation, it is not a distinct
process. Not every authorized person acts as a representative, which makes au-
thorization a necessary condition but not an exclusive marker for representation.
Even non-democratic representation requires authorization. Pitkin points out
that Hobbes! concept of representation can be understood as an authorization
concept, but remains essentially anti-democratic as once authorized, a repre-
sentative cannot be held accountable (Pitkin 1967; Runciman 2009, 16). For po-
litical representation to function democratically, representatives must be ac-
countable for their acts. Through the possibility of sanctioning, responsiveness is
formally established.
Descriptive representation looks at the extent to which representatives mirror
the characteristics of their representees (a term used by Pettit 2009) and usually
1 Other authors discuss representation along the lines of simulative, enactive, inter-
pretive representation (Pettit 2010); standing, acting and speaking for someone (Shapiro
et al. 2009); For an excellent overview of different concepts see Dovi 2017.
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refers to categories of difference, such as gender, age, ethnicity, language, skin
color, sexual orientation, class, etc. Accuracy of resemblance is the ideal of de-
scriptive representation. JaneMansbridge describes descriptive representation as
representation by representatives who are “in their own persons and lives in some
sense typical of the larger class of persons whom they represent” (1999, 629).
Thereby she wants to point out that descriptive representation is not necessarily
limited to outward criteria but also involves shared experiences, like a certain
profession. For federal political systems, regional representation is usually also an
important descriptive issue. Particularly in feminist theories of representation, the
issue of descriptive likeliness received great attention. The presence of women in
representative functions is a long standing claim (Campbell, Childs, and Love-
nduski 2010); one that has been extended to minorities and marginalized societal
groups.
Pitkin discusses symbolic representation a second aspect of “standing for”
representation. She describes it as the meaning representees ascribe to the rep-
resentatives. Whether a representee identifies with a representative because they
share features or for any other symbolic ascription is irrelevant, as symbolic
representation happens on the level of emotions (Stokke and Selboe 2009, 59).
This aspect relates to non-formalistic ways of authorization. As representees are
not involved in acts of representation, their non-objection functions as some kind
of presence in absence, as David Runciman argues (2009, 94). Ascribed meaning
and the acceptance related to it is then a crucial element to stabilize the process of
representation.
Substantive representation refers to actions of representatives and the extent
to which they serve the interests of the represented. Such interest representation
is then the most straight-forward aspect of representation. Pitkin assumes, in a
rather essentialist manner, the presence of social groups within society whose
interests can be fed into the political process. This involves a general re-
sponsiveness to group needs as well as the according voting behavior. Interests, in
Pitkin!s view, are relatively stable and given, something that can be picked up for
the purpose of representation.
There is an ongoing debate on how standing-for and substantive representation
relate. Older social scientific studies have already shown that female repre-
sentatives do not necessarily act according what is understood as women!s in-
terests (Diamond 1977). Clearly, female representatives are not necessarily
feminist representatives. In fact, not onlymediating factors, such as party political
logics and institutional norms, might prevent them from doing so, but differing
political attitudes can be a reason for female representatives not to act in what is
identified as the substantive interests of women (Celis and Childs 2012). Still,
scholars like Iris Marion Young (Young 2002), Jane Mansbridge (Mansbridge
1999) and Michelle L. Swers (Swers 2002) have demonstrated how descriptive
representation ofwomenhas effects beyond themost direct aspect of “acting for”,
namely raising responsiveness to women!s interest on a more general level, and
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most importantly the inclusion of women into the circle of those perceived as able
to rule.
Pitkin!s work is still a useful starting point when thinking about representation.
Her differentiation of aspects of representation is a well-structured approach,
useful to analyze different facets of political representation. There is, however,
severe criticism concerning the accuracy of approaches to representation that
focus closely on the political system and its institutions and understand repre-
sentation as a principal agent relationship (Severs and Dovi 2018, 309). Pitkin!s
essentialist view on both groups and interests is definitely outdated.
Following the cultural turn in social sciences, groups are rather understood in
the sense of #imagined communities! than as bounded entities (Anderson 1991).
Equally, amore complex understanding of political processes includes themaking
of both interests and groups in the course of representation, rather than their
given presence (Celis and Childs 2012). The performative act of representation
constitutes and constructs political realities (Diehl 2015, 10). Such discursive
views understand representation as “a #practice! in which the object of repre-
sentation and the grounds on which it is defended, co-determine #who! and #what!
is considered politically legitimate and how #interests! are to be represented”
(Crivits et al. 2018, 475).
As much as Pitkin!s work is central to political system centered approaches to
representation, Michael Saward!s work is central to the scholarly debate about
discursive representation. In his book “The representative claim”, Saward put
forward a constructivist understanding in studying representation and suggests
focusing on discursive representation and claims-making instead of investigating
representation as a principal agent relationship (2010). His arguments also
strongly built on the disability of political system focused approaches to grasp
power relations and the (non-)representation of marginalized groups, non-state
centered, international forms of representations and dynamics of representation.
In short, Saward and scholars of discursive representation increasingly try to
avoid the shortcomings of #standard accounts of democratic representation!
(Urbinati and Warren 2008) by perceiving discursive acts, defined as claims, as
representation.
This way of thinking denies theorists the possibility to identify what the in-
terests of representees are and, in consequence the assessment of their repre-
sentation. Only the perception of representees with regard to representative acts
can be assessed. In this perspective, also representatives are not concerned with
making claims according to women!s or worker!s interests but aim at making
claims that resonate among their voters. The conditions in which these claims are
made are then the focus in analyzing discursive representation.
Despite a heavy reception, Michael Saward!s “representative claim” is con-
sidered as a dead end by some scholars. The constructivist perspective does not
allow the identification of interests and thereby questions every concept of
democratic representation and, in consequence, the possibility of democratic
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politics itself (Disch 2015). Such contrasting of a political system orientation and a
discursive approach is hardly fruitful. Rather, I suggest combining these ways of
thinking to enhance the standard perspective on political representation. Saward
himself points out “that democratic representation contains, but is not exhausted
by, the familiar machinery of liberal representative democracy” (2012, 78). And,
although national political systems have lost power to corporations, civil society
and supra-national political actors, they are far from being irrelevant.
A combination of both perspectives is useful when we look at the different
aspects of representation and their crises. Therefore, I will stick to Pitkin!s concept
in structuring this article but include awider understanding of representation than
that as a principal agent-relationship. Informed by the constructivist perspective
on groups and interest, I analyze the crisis of representation along standard
procedures of political representation in a liberal democratic setting.
2. Problems of Liberal Democratic Representation
If we ask for the crisis of political representation, we find pressing issues for each
of the aspects of representation described by Hanna Pitkin that relate inherently
to the concept of representation, triggered by recent societal transformation
processes. While these transformations are not the only possible way in which the
concept of political representation might be challenged, their current dense
constellation leads to a perception of crisis.
a) Formal Representation
Regarding formal representation, elections as an institution to grant both au-
thorization and accountability is delegitimized by a growing gap between those
who are involved in decision making and those that are affected. This boundary
problem (Dahl 2000; Goodin 2007; Gruber andWalter 2013) is both the result of
increasing numbers of residents who are not citizens and shrinking voting rates
due to decreasing interest in “mainstream representative politics” (Saward 2010,
1) on the nation state level.2 Here lies the first currently pressing problem of the
concept of liberal democratic political representation, as formal representation in
a liberal democracy strives for widest inclusion to grant equality. Those affected
by representative acts should be involved in authorization processes and be able
to hold representatives accountable.
AsDavid Runciman discusses, this accountability is crucial to the very concept
of representation, as the represented become somewhat present only through
their ability to object: “Representation implies that the represented donotmerely
bear the consequences of another!s action, but have some presence in the action
2 Authorization and accountability are also a challenge on a global scale, as currently
most evident in climate politics (see for example Caney 2005).
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itself by dint of this fact. In other words, they must be capable of asserting their
stake.” (2007, 96) This is not the case when significant parts of the population are
excluded from both aspects of formal representation or refuse to participate.
The question of how the electorate is constituted and who is actually (not)
voting has become ever more pressing over the past years. The number of resi-
dents who are not entitled to vote is rising due to migration movements and small
naturalization numbers, which results in a crisis of representation (see Bauböck
and Carens 2018). For Austria, the share of foreign citizens grew from 8.6 percent
in 1999 to 15.3 percent in 2017,3 and similar trends are observable across Western
Europe. In cities, these numbers are usually higher and in particularly diverse
areas, those entitled to vote are only a thin majority. In the Austrian capital
Vienna, the share of foreign citizens is on average 25 percent and as high as 42.8
percent in some districts (Rudolfsheim-Fünfhaus)4.
Another aspect that limits representativeness in a formalistic sense is citizens
who do not exercise their right to vote. As they are not formally excluded from
participation, falling turnouts are also a matter of symbolic representation and
will be discussed below. From the perspective of formal representation, both the
exclusion of larger shares of the population and the refusal to participate are not
foreseen and limit the legitimacy of liberal democratic political representation.
b) Descriptive Representation
Descriptive representation is a challenged concept as migration processes and
changing perceptions of difference result in ongoing diversification both in width
and in depth. In the debate over descriptive representation, scholars distinguish
microcosmic and selective approaches. While the former aims at an exact mir-
roring of the total population and can only be achieved through lottery, the latter
is the reality of liberal democratic representation. “In the far more frequent
#selective! form of descriptive representation, institutional design gives selected
groups greater descriptive representation than they would achieve in existing
electoral systems in order to bring the proportions of those groups in the legis-
lature closer to their percentages in the population.” (Mansbridge 1999, 633). For
most parts of Europe, current informal section criteria result in an over-repre-
sentation of males, the highly educated, white people and a certain age group.
Despite the growing acceptance for the representation of some group char-
acteristics, there is little reason for enthusiasm.Descriptive representation follows
larger societal trends regarding the perception and acceptance of diversity. For
example, changing societal stands (as well as significant court rulings) on diversity
allow for more visibility of some groups (especially women and LGBTQ people,
see Reynolds 2013; Wängnerud 2009). Although women!s voting rights are well
established by now, Cuba (49 percent), Bolivia (51 percent) and Rwanda (63
3 See derstandard.at (2017), “Ein Viertel der Bewohner Wiens darf nicht wählen”.
4 See ORF.at (2017), “Jeder vierte Wiener nicht wahlberechtigt”.
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percent) are the only countries in the world that reach a representation of women
in parliament that matches the population (data.worldbank.org). Regarding
other forms of diversity, especially concerningmarkers of difference that relate to
migration, it seems acceptance for descriptive representation remains low.
As Iris Marion Young pointed out, the descriptive likeliness of representatives
is crucial for democratic inclusion but any group inclusion bears the danger of
excluding another (2002, 87 f.). Whichmarker of difference is the most important
to be mirrored in political representation? Gender, religion, age, region, lan-
guage, class? And when, if at all, can we assume common interests of woman,
homosexuals, Protestant Christians, best agers, Tyrolianys, Carinthian Slovenes,
construction workers? The vast literature on “groupism”, “imagined commun-
ities” and intersectionality discusses the multiple ways in which descriptive rep-
resentation therefore clearly has limits (Gold and Haynie 2014; Brubaker 2002;
McCall 2005).
This further relates to a crucial point for the following discussion of liberal
democratic representation: Descriptive likeliness relates to group characteristics
and thereby group representation. The liberal democratic concept by contrast,
puts the individual at the center of political representation, which brings along the
challenge of weighing individual and group interests. Some individuals will ex-
perience inequality due to group membership, whether or not these groups are
imagined or ascribed. Also to guarantee freedom might require acknowledging
group needs, as the examples of religious freedom and the non-discrimination on
the grounds of sexual orientation show. Ignoring groups therefore undermines the
liberal goals of equality and freedom. Governing groups by contrast always limits
the fundamental liberal democratic focus on the individual as bearer of equal
rights.
The inherent dilemma of descriptive representation can then be subsumed as
the most likely permanent inability to mirror societal diversity in its fluidity and
multitude, while at the same time, such mirroring is needed to prevent exclusion.
Growing numbers of characteristics people claim representation for, as well as a
refusal to allow for the representation of some characteristics, results in a virulent
problem and contribute to the current crisis of representation.
c) Symbolic Representation
The symbolic view on representation looks at the meaning people ascribe to their
representatives. Here, we simultaneously observe a growing disaffection from
formal politics and the increasing success of politicians of populist and author-
itarian style who push for a symbolic charging of the nation (Beyme 2018). Both
developments are symptoms of a crisis of representation.
Identification with political parties that where formative for many post-war
European democracies has been declining for decades now. In many cases, po-
litical parties used to have an all-encompassing agenda for their partygoers! life
courses (Andeweg and Farrell 2017).While these parties are still most relevant to
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the formal political system, the dissociation of voters and mainstream parties is
growing and results in low turnouts. This is further pushed by dissatisfaction with
these established actors. Scholars name a series of reasons for this dissatisfaction,
reaching from economic insecurity in a post-industrial economy to powerlessness
of political actors in the light of technocracy, supra-national governance and all-
mighty corporations, and a cultural backlash in a retro reaction to societal value
change (Inglehart and Norris 2016; Cox 2018; Torre 2014).
Suchmanifold transformation processes allowed populist parties to step in and
gain significant success by claiming to speak “for the people”, used synonymously
for the claim to represent more immediate than mainstream parties. Populist
actors are then often perceived as an alternative to the established system of
political parties. Populist rhetoric is chargedwith symbolic references aimed at the
stimulation of emotions. Mobilizing fear, nostalgia and a romanticized vision of
the nation characterizes the successful strategies of right-wing populists across
Europe. While their claims are not necessarily anti-democratic, they usually turn
against the liberal ideals of freedom and equality.
Populists! claim to speak for the people is increasingly accepted as a valid claim,
and their agenda is adopted by mainstream parties (Bale et al. 2010; Gruber and
Bale 2014), resulting in mainstream and right-wing actors who push an illiberal
agenda. In fact, as Fielitz and Laloire argue, “illiberalmodels of democracy”, such
as in Poland and Hungary, prove populist actors! “capacity to transform entire
political systems” (2016, 15). It can be reasonably assumed that this relates di-
rectly to the crisis of symbolic representation: Dissociation of established party
structures, anti-establishment attitudes, political discontent are symptoms of the
diminishing meaning a growing number of people no longer ascribe to main-
stream political representatives.
As Runciman argues, representees! non objection is required to allow their
presence in absence in processes of representation. A diminishing ascribed
symbolic meaning results in an objection that limits this presence. In this case,
liberal democratic representation foresees to hold representatives accountable
and replace them. The current challenging of representation by actors that ac-
tually oppose the liberal foundation of contemporary democracies makes evident
that this systemof representation is unable to protect itself against its abolition (as
famously discussed by Böckenförde 1976).
d) Substantive Representation
Substantive representation is expressed in the prioritization of policy preferences
of the represented. Here, Michael Saward!s thinking is crucial, as he argues that
we cannot simply assume interests are taken for granted. He states that a claim is
not merely representing the interests of those represented but that representa-
tiveness depends on the extent to which a claim is accepted as being repre-
sentative and resonates among the represented.
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What political analysists often overlook is that the interests looked atmight not
be quite accurate. For example, being female might not be the group identity that
a person develops her interests upon. As a study on female Trump voters shows,
holding sexist and racist attitudes was more influential to women in their decision
to vote for Trump than what is understood as gender related interests (Setzler and
Yanus 2018). Also, a policy might actually hurt a particular group but is sold to
them as being in their interest. Timothy Snyder speaks of “sadopopulists” (2018),
when referring to populist actors who make policies against the interest of the
people they claim to speak for.
When looking at substantive representation, the critique of Pitkin!s approach
becomes most evident. Still, the complete dissolution of interests questions
democratic representation as such, therefore I view (group) interests as heavily
influenced by discourses but not as inexistent. For some time, strong party ties and
a greater congruency of societal cleavages and political parties aligned interests,
representative!s claims and their acceptance. However, as discussed above, these
societal structures are increasingly eroding. The concept of democratic repre-
sentation still builds on these societal structures. Unaligned interests and
changing group identifications are a pitfall to the concept of liberal democratic
representation and a central element in the crisis of substantive representation.
The crisis of representation then includes formal aspects with regard to au-
thorization and accountability in democratic entities that exclude more andmore
people from these processes. It further constitutes a limited descriptive repre-
sentation due to the (ongoing) exclusion of people with certain markers of dif-
ference and inability of microcosmic reflection of a growing diversity. In symbolic
terms, we observe a dissociation of people and established structures of repre-
sentation. This relates to the crisis of substantive representation, which results
from diverging societal interests and, as revealed by a discursive perspective on
representation, a limited ability to understand interests as something given in
society instead of something created through representation itself.
3. Politicized Religion and the Crisis of Representation
In the course of the ongoing, severe societal transformations described above,
religion plays a crucial role in multiple ways. Having described the crisis of po-
litical representation in more general terms, I want to discuss recent develop-
ments inAustrian politics on religion, against the backdrop of these developments
in the following. Therefore I briefly describe the Austrian case and the empirical
studies I draw on, followed by a discussion of religion and the crisis of repre-
sentation in Austria.
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3.1. Austria: Land of Milk and Honey for Religious and Far Right Populists
alike?
I chose this provocative headline, as Austrian politics is a prominently featured
case both in studies on right-wing populism and religious inclusiveness (see for
example Kitschelt and McGann 1997; Hainsworth 2016; respectively Foret and
ItÅaina 2013; Mattes, Goetsch, and Rosenberger 2017). Today, Austria has, de-
spite recent setbacks, a highly inclusive system of state-religion relations and one
of the strongest populist far right parties in Europe (Freiheitliche Partei Ös-
terreichs, FPÖ), which is, since 2017, also in government. Both relate closely to
Austrian history and, in a way, the shirking of dealing with it.
Austria!s religious inclusiveness is a relic from the Hapsburg monarchy, when
for tactical reason, and maybe as well in the spirit of Enlightenment, rather tol-
erant legislation allowed for religious diversity (Klieber 2010). After 1945, the
Austrian body of law was mostly adopted from the pre-WWII and pre-Austro-
fascist period. Also, the 1912 Islam Law was still in force when growing religious
diversity became an issue in post-war Austria. A group of Muslims founded a
Kultusgemeinde in the 1970s, which resulted in a legally acknowledged Islamic
Religious Community in Austria that became the official representation for
Muslims in Austria (Kroissenbrunner 2002). Until 2013, when an Alevi religious
community was granted the same legal status, it served as a single point of contact
for state actors.
The inclusiveness of Austrian state religion relation is not limited to an in-
stitutional setting that guarantees a broad set of privileges for 16 legally ac-
knowledged religious communities (see Bundeskanzleramt, Kirchen und Reli-
gionsgemeinschaften); it also led to inclusive decision making when it came to
issues of religious freedom. Examples for this, could be found when the Muslim
headscarf was discussed across Europe in the early 2000s (see Rosenberger and
Sauer 2013), or in the case of male circumcision (Wieshaider 2016). In these and
other cases, coalition governments including the populist far right, as well as grand
coalitions of Social Democrats (Sozialdemokratische ParteiÖsterreichs, SPÖ) and
People!s Party (Österreichische Volkspartei, ÖVP) refrained from restraining re-
ligious rights. This tradition of inclusiveness has changed in recent years, in par-
ticular with regard to Islam (Hafez andHeinisch 2018). Here, longstanding claims
from the far right, such as the ban of face veiling, were recently implemented.
This relates to the second characteristic of the particular information-rich
Austrian case, a strong and long-established populist right. Unlike Germany,
Austria did not go through a phase of severe examination of its National Socialist
past, as it was claimed to be “the first victim” of Nazi-aggression (Rathkolb 2015).
This also resulted in the continued existence of a political representation of the,
traditionally anti-cleric “third camp”5. In 1949, the Association of Independents
5 In the interwar period, Austrian politics was split into three camps: socialist,
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(Verband der Unabhängigen) formed as a political gathering place of former
National-Socialists and fascists (Pelinka 2002, 286 f.). In 1956, the Austrian
Freedom Party (Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs) absorbed this party. Anton Pel-
inka argues that the FPÖ as awhole stood in theNational Socialist tradition.After
a liberal phase between 1970 and 1986, Jörg Haider became party leader and the
party position shifted to right-wing populism. Since 1986 the Austrian Freedom
Party was successful in most elections and gained up to 26 percent of the votes at
national elections. A party schism brought the current party leader Heinz-
Christian Strache, who entered a coalition government with theAustrian People!s
Party in 2017, to the forefront. Under Strache!s lead, the party did not only put
anti-Islam campaigns at the center of their political strategy, it also contrasted
these with references to Austria!s and their own Christian character (Sauer and
Ajanovic 2016).
3.2. Empirical Database and Analysis
This paper draws on the empirical work from a larger project on the politics of
religion and migration in Austria (Mattes 2017a, 2017b, 2018). This project built
on four sources of data material: Policy documents on immigrant integration
issued in Austria between 2005 and 2013, a formative phase for Austrian immi-
grant integration policies; Press releases and campaign material in relation to the
policy documents were used to complement the picture; Parliamentary protocols
allowed the inclusion of data material within a larger period, namely 1993–2013;
For this article, the data collection has been further extended to 2017. Finally,
qualitative interviews were conducted to bring in policy makers! and religious
representatives! voices.
Christian-social, andGerman-nationalist (Campbell andGerlich 2000). Also in post-war
Austria, the latter is usually referred to as the “third camp”.
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Parliamentary
Protocols
(1993–2017)
Policy Documents Interviews
Number of
documents
analysed:
464
– Expert Analysis on
Integration #Ge-
meinsam kommen wir
zusammen! (2008) Press releases and
campaigns by Minis-
try of Interior
INTAT1:
Federal Ministry
for Europe, In-
tegration and For-
eign Affairs
02/15/15, Vienna
– Survey #Integration in
Austria! (2010)
– National Action Plan
for Integration (2010)
INTA2:
Islamic Religious
Community in
Austria
08/31/16, Vienna
Number of
quotations
coded:
839
(in 126 docu-
ments)
– Work Program Ex-
perts Council for In-
tegration
– Annual Progress Re-
port on the National
Action Plan for In-
tegration (2011)
Press releases and
campaigns by State
Secretariat for In-
tegration
– Annual Progress Re-
port on the National
Action Plan for In-
tegration (2012)
– Report on the Dia-
logue Forum Islam
INTAT3:
Archdiocese of
Vienna
26/09/16 Vienna– Annual Progress Re-
port on the National
Action Plan for In-
tegration (2013)
Table 1: Overview Data Material
Policy documents were analysed using qualitative content analysis (Hsieh and
Shannon 2005). Parliamentary protocols were analysed using a simple version of
quantitative content analysis in combination with a qualitative content analysis
(Kelle 2004). Interview transcripts were analysed using a #themed analysis!
(Froschauer andLueger 2003). In the following part of the paper I will, though not
exclusively, draw on this study to build and underline my argument.
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3.3. Religion and the Crisis of Representation in Austria
The guiding question for this paper is how religion relates to the idealistic concept
of liberal democratic representation and its inherent pitfalls, and which under-
lying problems of liberal democratic representation the case of politicized religion
helps to understand. To answer this question I want to look at the current crisis of
representation in Austria and the ways religion is involved in it. I start by looking
at each aspect of Pitkin!s concept of representation and assess religion!s general
relevance to liberal democratic representation, followed by a discussion of ele-
ments of politicizations identified in the empirical analysis of the Austrian case.
a) Formal Representation
When we look at formal political representation in liberal democracies, religion
should simply be irrelevant. Religious affiliation is not only protected by anti-
discrimination legislature, freedom of religion is also guaranteed by the com-
mitment to universal human rights and constitutional regulations. In a narrow
understanding of formal representation through elections, neither authorization
nor accountability can be formally based on religious affiliation or attitudes to-
wards religion.
When we look more closely and apply a slightly wider understanding, we find
that religion can be a relevant factor on a formal level of representation, and in
fact for both representees and representatives.Unlike the liberal democratic ideal
of strict religion-state separation, many European states installed so called
“systems of cooperation” that foresaw privileges and duties of acknowledged
communities on a constitutional level (Minkenberg 2003). Political scientists like
WayneHudson (2003), or Julia Mour¼o Permoser and Sieglinde Rosenberger for
Austria (2009) argue that within a concept ofmultiple citizenships (national, local,
EUropean, global, etc.), what they call “religious citizenship” is often overlooked.
While this “religious citizenship” is not a legal status like nationality, membership
in a religious community can open windows of opportunity through group rep-
resentation, also in formal terms.
For Austria, Mour¼o Permoser and Rosenberger argue, that due to the Aus-
trian systemof cooperative state-religion relations, religiousmembership is in fact
a benefit for non-citizens. People might be entitled to vote for a religious repre-
sentative (e.g. in the legally acknowledged Islamic and Jewish Communities),
despite not being entitled to vote for state representatives. While migrants in
general do not have an official representative channel, they might have one
through their religious affiliation. The system of cooperation between state and
legally acknowledged religious communities foresees consultation of religious
organizations for all matters of religion politics, and, to a lesser extent, also in
other legislative procedures. “Religious citizenship” entails both a legal form of
representation and a more general discursive one. This is especially relevant for
155
Liberal Democratic Representation and the Politicization of Religion
Interdisciplinary Journal for Religion and Transformation (2018), Heft 7, doi.org/10.14220/jrat.2018.4.issue-2
Open-Access-Publikation im Sinne der CC-Lizenz BY-NC-ND 4.0 
(https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/)
religious communities that have large shares of migrant members, such as the
Islamic community and Christian-Orthodox churches.
On the other side, there is a utilization of religious communities to implement
immigrant integration policies, treating them as representatives of migrants,
rather than as religious actors. As discussed by various authors, religious com-
munities and Islamic communities in particular, become subject of the practice of
governing through community (Tezcan 2012; Ragazzi 2016).While for some time
in the early 2000s and especially through a multiculturalism lens, these practices
have been assessed as inclusive, the specific politicization of IslamandMuslims, as
well as growing resentments among the public and policymakers alike, lead to the
assessment that such representation is barely able to lead towardsmore legitimate
authorization or wider accountability (Mattes 2017a). As an interviewee from the
Islamic Religious Community in Austria put it: “Even in my official function I
encounter people who really have a hard time digesting that it is possible to be
Muslim andAustrian. Islam is something out ofAustria, tolerated in a guest status,
at best.” (AT2, 04:08)
As it bears the danger of further exclusion I do not view a stronger involvement
of religious communities as a solution for better formal representation of religious
migrants. The selective process of acknowledging religious communities only
considers a very specific sub-group of religiously affiliated people and therefore
cannot function as a way to include foreign citizens. Rather, an individual in-
volvement through the acquisition of citizenship is desirable to improve liberal
democratic representation. There are no official numbers of religious affiliations
among migrants and naturalizations. Looking at the most politicized example of
religious migrants, Muslims in Austria, it is estimated that around 50 percent of
the 700 000 Muslims living in the country hold Austrian citizenship (Hager and
Peternel 2018).6
Obviously, naturalized members of religious minorities are entitled to partic-
ipate in elections, which means that representatives are accountable to them.
However, even if religious minorities are involved in representation processes, a
minority position in democratic election only allows for limited influence. There
are various concepts and reform ideas to improve minority representation,
reaching from affirmative action to quotas, but all of them bear the danger to
undermine the liberal focus on the individual. In fact, representative democracy is
conceptualized to avoid the “tyranny of the masses”, as representatives are sup-
posed to act in the democratic interest of minority representation. In light of the
current politicization of religion – Christianity and Islam as markers for self- and
otherness – the extent to which representatives fulfill this task is questionable.
6 There are no estimations of the share of Austrian citizens among the 500 000 or-
thodox Christians and around 15 000 Jews living in Austria (Goujon, Jurasszovich, and
Potancˇokov' 2017).
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Therefore, religious representation is hardly suitable to address the formal
problem of the growing number of non-represented.
b) Descriptive Representation
Descriptive representation is, as argued by Young, a potential source for demo-
cratic representation that aims towards justice (2002, 82). But to what extent is
religion relevant for descriptive representation? As religion is a typical category
of difference, it is regularly discussed with regards to descriptive representation.
Young differentiates between cultural and structural differences andwould, in the
first place, view religion as a cultural difference, as opposed to a structural one like
gender, sexual orientation and race. For Europe, scholarly literature increasingly
assesses a racialization of religion and Islam in particular. As Fatima El-Tayeb
argues, in a European context where race is a historic societal taboo, veiled
Muslim women become the visible other to the essentially white European self
(El-Tayeb 2011, 16).
In addition to whether difference is cultural or structural, we can look at the
perception and presentation of difference. While many members of Austrian
parliament are religiously affiliated, very few make their religious position ex-
plicit. Assessing the composition of the Austrian National Assembly in the XXVI
legislative period (which began in 2017 and does not significantly differ from
former periods), four among the five members with a migration background have
roots in Muslim-majority regions (Draxler and Schaffer 2017). None of them
presents him/herself as a devout believer or claims to stand forMuslims inAustria.
Some explicitly see themselves as secular or not practicing Muslims (Pink 2008;
Rajkovic 2017); another Muslim parliamentarian explicitly states his skepticism
about the relation of religion and politics in general (Dönmez 2017). There are
two Jewishmembers of parliament, one of them claims to be the first “active Jew”
in post-war Austrian Parliament (kurier.at 2017). With regard to different
Christian representatives, oneway to assess their presence is the affiliation ofMPs
with Christian organizations (see webpage Meine Abgeordneten) but only few
Christian parliamentarians proactively communicate their religious affiliation.
Findings from the “Giving Voice Project” that investigated descriptive repre-
sentation in Austrian parliament show that religion, mingled with the label “im-
migrant background”, is a double edged sword. While religious affiliation is in-
creasingly pointed out amongmale candidates of Turkish origin, other candidates
(especially Muslim women who do not wear a headscarf) are perceived and ad-
dressed as religious candidates to a lesser extent (Rosenberger and Stöckl 2016).
Instead of standing for Muslims in Austria, these candidates aimed to be per-
ceived as party representatives. Even if political actors of a particular faith would
want to stand for the religious community, it would be unclear whose religion they
represent, as spectrums of religiosity reach from secular affiliation to active
practice and devout dedication. Descriptive religious representation, then, is
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limited to single representatives, who explicitly claim standing for very specific
groups.
Rather than looking at descriptive likeliness in relation to substantive interest
representation, we can assess the relevance of the presence of minority charac-
teristics among representatives parallel toMichelle L. Swers findings on women!s
representation (2002): Presence of especially marginalized religious people is
crucial to raise the responsiveness to minority interest on a more general level,
and can include these marginalized people into the circle of those perceived as
able to rule.
c) Symbolic Representation
The relevance of religion for symbolic representation relates closely to the
problemof diverse groups and homogenous labels. According to Pitkin!s concept,
symbolic representation considers the role of “irrational belief” and “the im-
portance of pleasing one!s constituency” (1967, 111). Descriptive likeliness might
occur, but representation also requires the represented to view the representa-
tives as standing for them. In recent years, religion played an increasing role in
both the “irrational beliefs” of voters and the attempts to please them by repre-
sentatives.
According to surveys, the share of people who view Austria as a “Christian
country” is high, at about 76 % (IMAS 2016, 3). Recent numbers from a study on
Christians in Western Europe show that while 80 percent view themselves as
Christian, only 30 percent go to church from time to time or regularly (Pew
ResearchCenter 2018). 39 percent even stated that one needs to beChristian to be
“one of us” (ibid.). Christian religious representation then seems to be not so
much about descriptive likeliness but about symbolic representation and the
“irrational belief” related to it.
The politicization of religious symbols functions as a prime example. In many
European states, among them Austria, full-face veiling has been legally banned.
Despiteminimal numbers of womenwearing this particular clothing, themeasure
has been argued to be integrative and necessary to stop “counter-society”
(Marchart 2016). In the course of the same legal brief, religious symbols for
magistrates in court were to be dismissed7, but the government representatives
immediately stressed, that this would not concern the crucifixes, which are in-
stalled in Austrian court rooms. Despite rapidly shrinking numbers of practicing
Christians in Austria, the crucifix in public places like courts and schools has been
heatedly debated and representatives mostly favor or refrain from opposing their
presence. Current Vice-Chancellor Heinz-Christian Strache, from the far right
and-populist Austrian Freedom Party, famously held a speech against “Islam-
ization”, holding a crucifix in his hand and publicly talked about his Catholic
confirmation at the age of 39 (derstandard.at 2009). Here, religion becomes a
7 In the end, this measure was not introduced by law, but through an executive order.
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symbol to please voters and serve the irrational believe that religion relates to
belonging.
Saward!s focus on the discursive construction of meaning, and in particular the
concept of boundary drawing, helps to assess this symbolic level of representation.
Symbolic boundaries are #conceptual distinctions! that social actors implement to
#separate people into groups and generate feelings of similarity and group
membership! (Lamont andMoln'r 2002, 168) and these examples for the current
politicization of religion demonstrate its functioning.
In theory, the usage of religion for symbolic boundary drawing puts liberal
democratic actors in a dilemma, as they commit to state neutrality (Madeley
2003). However, drawing on religion for boundary-making is in practice not
limited toAustria!s far right populist representatives.As shown in other studies on
mainstream integration policies, what it means “to be Austrian” is often linked to
Christianity, which is presented as the source of liberalism and secularism (Mattes
2017b). An extreme example from an Austrian policy document states:
“The following discussion will show that the problem of integrating foreigners pre-
dominantly concernsmembers of the Islamic culture, to a lesser extent also those of other
(for example African or Asian) cultures.” (BMI 2008, p. 18)
This statement is followed by a discussion of #Austrian values!, a listing of liberal
norms. On the basic principle of equality the document states:
“The principle of equality derives from statements of the Old and especially the New
Testament, that all men are equal before God.” (BMI 2008, p. 20)
This raises the question to which extent symbolic representation for non-Chris-
tians is in possible, if legitimate representation is, in the current climate of po-
liticized religion, discursively linked to a Christian character of representees. The
electoral success of those representatives who engage in symbolic boundary
drawing on religion allows the assumption that the meaning representees ascribe
to representatives is equally dominated by the othering of Islam and Muslims.
d) Substantive Representation
Substantive representation relates to the contents of political representation,
which frequently involve religion inmanyways. Above, I discussed the difficulties
of unaligned interests for the purpose of representation.As became evident in the
discussion of symbolic representation and as frequently discussed by political
scientists, identity politics is becoming a societal cleavage along which some po-
litical representatives increasingly align themselves (Bale 2017). While it is dis-
cussed whether identity conflicts replace economic conflicts or disguise them,
their current predominance severely affects substantive representation. The
alignment of representatives along cleavages of identity politics also involves a
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repositioning towards liberal democracy. Increasingly, mainstream actors from
the center-right engage in the politicization of religion and Islam in particular.
This can be demonstrated when looking at claims about Islam and Muslims in
Austrian parliament. When asking who makes claims about Muslims, and what
the content of these claims is, results from a long-term study, that investigated
Islam in immigrant integration policy debates in the Austrian National Assembly
from1993 onwards, show the processes of alignment along the cleavage of identity
politics.
The overall development of average claims made per session (Fig 1) shows an
unsteady picture. While in 2001, the year the terror attacks of 9/11 were com-
mitted, a small peak is observable, the years that followed did not experience a
significant politicization of Islam and Muslims. Only in 2006/2007 much higher
numbers of claims made are observable, reaching up to 11 claims per parlia-
mentary session. This 2007 peakwas not observed in the following years, when, on
average 2–3 claims were made.
It is worth splitting up these results with regard to political parties to see which
actors make these claims. Between four and six parties held seats in Austrian
parliament. The traditionally largemainstream parties are the Social-Democratic
Party (SPÖ) and the Christian-democratic People!s Party (ÖVP). Since 1986
(until 2017), the Green Party was represented in the National Assembly. The
Austrian Freedom Party (FPÖ) had a split-off party (BZÖ) between 2005 and
2013 with an almost identical position, which was later on absorbed by the FPÖ.
Since 2013, there has been a liberal party in parliament (NEOS), and a billion-
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Figure 1: Average claims on Islam/Muslims per debate in Austrian National Assembly
(1993–2017)
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aire!s populist short term party project (Team Stronach) was present from 2013–
2017.
In 2001 (Fig. 2), we observe substantive representation of Islam as an issue for
niche parties. While the far right pushed the debate about Islam with security
claims, the Green party called for diversification. Both “niche parties” on the left
and right could have benefited from the politicization of the issue (Gruber 2014).
In 2007 (Fig. 3), when the far right (theAustrian FreedomParty and their split-off
BZÖ) decided to put anti-Islam rhetoric at the center of their voter mobilization
strategies (Rosenberger and Hadj-Abdou 2013), their share climbed up to 75
percent of the claims of a much higher total (as seen in Fig. 1).
In 2015 (Fig. 4), the populist far right no longer made an absolute majority of
claims (33 percent), but the Christian-democratic ÖVP (32 percent) and the lib-
eral NEOS (28 percent) each have a similar sized share. The Austrian Social-
Democratic Party (5 percent) and the Greens (1 percent) hardly made any claims
on Islam/Muslims anymore.
Over the years, we see a development from niche, to far right, to mainstream.
Politicization started as a niche party phenomenon (2001), was then pushed by the
far right (2007) and resulted in politicization throughout the right of the political
spectrum (2015).
To provide information on the content of these claims, the data was also coded
with regards to the issues addressed. Through inductive category development, six
52%
24%
12%
12%
2001
FPÖ
GRÜNE
SPÖ
ÖVP
Figure 2: Claims on Islam/Muslims in Austrian National Assembly in 2001 by political
party, n=33
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Figure 3: Claims on Islam/Muslims in Austrian National Assembly in 2007 by political
party, n=216
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Figure 4: Claims on Islam/Muslims in Austrian National Assembly in 2015 by political
party, n=105
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issue clusters were identified8. If we look at the issues addressed (Fig. 5), we see
that populist far right claims (FPÖ/BZÖ) focused on security (36 percent) and
values (33 percent), to a lesser extent on establishment issues (then usually di-
rected towards the withdrawal of rights). Overall, the ÖVP made most of their
claims on differentiation (26 percent), followed by values (22). 18 percent of the
party!s claims weremade on establishment and dialogue. Social-Democrats made
46 percent of their claims on differentiation, followed by establishment and values
(15 percent each). The Green Party focused on differentiation (56 percent) or
general issues of integration. Two parties were in parliament only for the last
legislative period under observation (2013–2017) and show very different pat-
terns. Team Stronach!s claim-making resembles the far right pattern, focusing on
security (47 percent) and values (30 percent). The liberal NEOS focused on dif-
ferentiation (36 percent), establishment (32 percent) and values (18 percent).
If wemerge these results (Fig. 6) and look at the overall claims-making, we see
distinct patterns. First, the far right (FPÖ and BZÖ) dominated the debate and
made, overall, 62 percent of the claims during the 20 year period of observation.
All other parties played amuch smaller role, theymade less claims and if they did,
they addressed different issues. The left pushed for differentiation, but in the
overall picture, these claims played a minor role.
While the study is not suitable to assess the role of religion for substantive
representation as such, the empirical data clearly shows an interest alignment on
the right of the political spectrum along the lines of religious identity politics over
the past years. Rather than arguing that it is in Christians! interest to claim the
exclusion of Islam and Muslims, as the populist far right suggests, we have to
deploy Saward!s perspective on discursive representation: Interests are never
essential; they are not something that is just there, waiting to be picked up by
political representatives but something that is both produced and reproduced in
the process of representation. The boundary drawing against Muslims is also
therefore an interest that is discursively produced, resonates among representees
and is again represented by political actors.
Equality might be the liberal goal, but it is inequality that many voters are
calling for. Populist actors are willing to represent this call for inequality and, at
8 dialogue: claims about Islam/Muslims related to interreligious dialogue, religious
diversity and the coexistence of religions; differentiation: claims about #Muslims! that
condemn generalizations overMuslims, discrimination againstMuslims or the anti-Islam
mobilization by political parties; establishment: claims on issues on the accommodation
of religion, state-religion relations and legal regulation of religious practices are sub-
sumed here; integration: claims about Islam/Muslims related to general notions of im-
migrant integration, including issues of residence status and participation are summar-
ized; security: claims about Islam/Muslims as a security threat or in relation to terrorist
organizations; values: claims about Islam/Muslims in the context of debates about col-
lective identity and common values.
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the same time, promote the exclusionary and often racist ideas behind it. Among
representatives of other parties, we observe three strategies: First, some left wing
actors might oppose the right-wing populists! argument directly, as the Green
party did in the early 2000s. Secondly, they might adopt the right-wing populist!s
argument, as the ÖVP has done in recent years. Finally, they might refrain from
engaging in the debate, as the SPÖ has done in recent years (and to a lesser extent
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Figure 5: Political parties! claims on Muslims/Islam by contextual issue (1993–2017//
2013–2017)
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Figure 6: Overall claims on muslims/Islam by contextual issue and political party (1993–
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the Green Party). So far, right-wing populists seem to benefit from each of these
strategies, as the first one creates a broader politicization, the second allows for
the implementation of measures through coalitions and the third enables the
attraction of voters that are concerned by the issue and feel their former repre-
sentatives are not providing solutions. Together, these strategies result in the
alignment of representatives on the right, along an identity politics cleavage.
4. ACrisis of Liberalism, Not a Crisis of Democracy? Towards a
Conclusion
The above discussion of empirical results shows us that the politicization of (re-
ligious) difference is closely related to the current crisis of representation in its
different facets. Formal representation depends on participation, which requires
both the willingness and the ability of the population to participate in author-
ization and accountability processes. This is currently challenged by growing
numbers of foreign citizens who are not entitled to vote and low turnouts among
those who hold citizenship. Religious citizenship, a concept described as bringing
privileges to the religiously affiliated, even if they do not hold citizenship, is not a
viable alternative as it bears the danger of exceptionalization and exclusion.
Descriptive representation is challenged by societal diversification on the one
hand, and the questionable essential character of societal groups on the other. The
extent, to which descriptive representation is possible, depends on the formation
of societal groups and their acceptance among the wider population. The politi-
cization of religion means that representatives who belong to religious minorities
are in a difficult situation, as they are asked to stand for a religious community,
while at the same time being confronted with a lacking acceptance of their af-
filiation. Symbolic representation, the meaning ascribed to representatives, also
faces the problemof increasingly exclusionary tendencies.Here, religion is among
the central elements representatives use to draw symbolic boundaries that reso-
nate among their voters. This relates to substantive representation which is
challenged by the dissolving societal cleavages and unaligned interests. The now
observable alignment of interests along an identity politics cleavage involves
religion and bears the danger to allow for a tyranny of the masses, something
liberal democratic representation is supposed to prevent.
Political liberalism names equality and freedom as the basis for a just system
and only operates within these limits. In the light of political representation it
becomes ever more evident that this principle of equality is under distress. Equal
representation for all, by all and of all is questioned not only at the intersection of
religion andmigration but in more general terms. As Kemmers et al. impressively
demonstrate for people with anti-establishment attitudes in the Netherlands,
explaining their behavior through deviance or viewing them as “losers of mod-
ernity” only works so far. Rather, the qualitative study shows that people con-
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sciously develop such attitudes, which involves “a profound change of their ideas
on, and subsequent evaluation of, the workings of politics and society” (2016,
768). As the aforementioned study on female Trump voters shows, holding sexist
and racist attitudes was more influential to women in their decision to vote than
the gender specific interests they were expected to vote on (Setzler and Yanus
2018).
The unpleasant part for those in favor of liberal democracy, which definitely
includes the majority of Europe!s political elites, is that the representation made
by the populist right and demanded by their voters is not undemocratic, it is just
not liberal. Following the logic of political system centered approaches to rep-
resentation, making these interests present in the political arena is still a demo-
cratic act. The constructivist!s perspective would add that these interests are
equally produced instead of just adopted and might lead to different conclusions.
Together, both perspectives allow the assessment of the crisis of political repre-
sentation, which seems to be, first and foremost, a crisis of competing norms and
the turn against liberalism. Yascha Mounk argues that liberalism and democracy
do not fit together as naturally as many people, and experts, believe. “The will of
the people increasingly goes against the rule of law and dissolve liberal democ-
racy.”9 (2018, 116 f)While I do not share his perception of the people!s will, as I am
with Saward!s conception of interests, Mounk makes an important point re-
garding the concepts of liberalism and democracy. The success story of the liberal
ideal to maximize freedom and equality goes hand in hand with democratization
process in many places. They are however, not inextricably linked.
As I argued in this paper, liberal democratic representation is currently under
multiple pressures. It is liberalism that is under attack, as well as the specific form
of representation that the normative concept of liberalism demands. Illiberal
forms of democracy are possible and in fact currently observable in European
states like Hungary and Poland. The question of how to prevent other countries,
likeAustria, from this development ismore than pressing and for sure there are no
simple solutions. A de-politicization of religion seems crucial, as liberal democ-
racy!s ability to function on group representation is limited. Both equality and
freedom are first and foremost norms for the individual. In the politicization of
religion, inequality is fostered on the basis of group affiliation. Liberal democ-
racies, therefore, require a juggling act to balance the two. Illiberal actors who are
not interested in holding up that balance have an easy game. Some scholars then
point at rule of law and the justice system as a security mechanism in liberal
democracy. In my view, this is not sufficient. Liberal democracy has to be won
discursively through the better argument and claims that resonate. These have to
include plausible places for religion in society that allow for the normalization of
religious diversity.
9 Translated by the author.
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